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TERRORIZING ADVOCACY
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT:
FREE EXPRESSION AND THE FALLACY OF
MUTUAL EXCLUSIVITY
Martin H. Redish* & Matthew Fisher**
Traditional free speech doctrine is inadequate to account for modern
terrorist speech. Unprotected threats and substantially protected lawful
advocacy are not mutually exclusive. This Article proposes recognizing a
new hybrid category of speech called “terrorizing advocacy.” This is a type
of traditionally protected public advocacy of unlawful conduct that
simultaneously exhibits the unprotected pathologies of a true threat. This
Article explains why this new category confounds existing First Amendment
doctrine and details a proposed model for how the doctrine should be
reshaped.
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INTRODUCTION
Recent concern about modern terrorists’ attempts to induce ideologically
driven violence in the United States has given rise to a dilemma for First
Amendment scholars. On the one hand, one could conclude that to preserve
our modern tradition of free expression, unlawful advocacy must be protected
unless the expression is likely to produce imminent criminal activity.1 That
First Amendment-protected advocacy might induce harmful but
nonimminent violence is simply a cost of doing business for the First
Amendment, regardless of the devastation that may result. On the other hand,
some suggest that traditional First Amendment protection must be suspended,
at least in the specific context of modern terrorist speech to prevent
potentially violent catastrophes, regardless of the inevitable harm to free and
open communication. Neither approach appears to provide a very
satisfactory solution. But perhaps the real problem is that neither scholars
nor jurists have recognized the inherent duality in the type of advocacy in
which modern terrorists usually engage.
Traditionally, criminal speech has been conceptualized in two mutually
exclusive categories: “true threats” and advocacy of unlawful conduct.2 No
one has seriously suggested that true threats—direct expressions by one
individual to another of the speaker’s intent to harm the other, often
conditioned on the victim’s willingness or unwillingness to comply with a
condition—are protected speech under the First Amendment. Such threats
are nothing more than unprotected speech—acts that constitute intimidation,
coercion, and terror—antithetical to the free and open communication and
persuasion contemplated by the First Amendment. Unlawful advocacy, on
the other hand, has had something of a roller-coaster history in First
Amendment doctrine. Now, however, under the controlling Brandenburg
test, it receives a substantial degree of constitutional protection.3
Courts generally assume that criminal speech is either an unprotected
threat or substantially protected unlawful advocacy.4 What they have failed
to recognize, however, is that criminal speech can simultaneously constitute
both an unprotected threat and protected unlawful advocacy. Publicly
communicated efforts to persuade willing listeners to violently harm a
1. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam). For a full discussion
of the Brandenburg test, see infra Part I.B.1.
2. For discussion of these doctrines, see infra Part I.B. For discussion of how courts
have treated these doctrines as mutually exclusive, see infra Part II.A.
3. See infra Part I.B.1.
4. See infra notes 65–71 and accompanying text.
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specific person or group of people falls under the heading of unlawful
advocacy and is therefore deserving of the degree of constitutional protection
normally afforded such expression. Such speech, however, simultaneously
constitutes a threat to those intended victims who witness the advocacy
because they may reasonably believe someone may be persuaded to harm
them. Indeed, modern terrorist strategy is a textbook illustration of how these
two pathologies intersect: publicly distributed advocacy of criminal violence
against a designated victim or victim group may well convince a willing
listener to take such action, but even if it fails to do so, the speech still has
the benefit to the speaker of intimidating the victims.
Just as terrorists strategically view their expression as containing elements
of both unlawful advocacy and coercive threats, so too should those
interpreting the First Amendment recognize that publicly distributed
unlawful advocacy will generally contain elements of both protected
expression and unprotected speech-act threats. The goal, then, must be to
adjust First Amendment treatment of such hybrid expression in order to
simultaneously recognize the coercive nonspeech element, as well as the
persuasive expressive element.
We propose recognizing a new hybrid category called “terrorizing
advocacy.” Terrorizing advocacy is a type of traditionally protected public
advocacy of unlawful conduct that simultaneously exhibits the unprotected
pathologies of a true threat. Terrorizing advocacy contains both a protected
persuasive, expressive element and an unprotected intimidating, coercive
element. Based on this insight, First Amendment doctrines dealing with
criminal speech must be reshaped to take into account the hybrid nature of
terrorizing advocacy.
Our goal in this Article is first to explain this intersecting duality and then
to fashion a proposed doctrinal model that seeks to accommodate both the
protected and unprotected elements of this kind of expression. Part I
discusses the challenge to current First Amendment doctrine posed by
terrorist messaging and how various scholars have responded to that
challenge.5 That Part then provides a brief background of the two First
Amendment doctrines—advocacy of unlawful conduct and true threats—that
are simultaneously implicated by terrorist messaging. Next, Part II explores
the concept of “terrorizing advocacy” and explains why this category of
speech confounds existing First Amendment doctrine. Part III details our
proposed model for how First Amendment doctrine should be reshaped to
account for hybrid messaging.
I. TERRORIST MESSAGING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
An examination of terrorist messaging within the context of the First
Amendment yields many challenges, which are discussed in Part I.A. Part
5. To accomplish the aims of this Article and streamline the theoretical discussion, this
Article assumes that terrorist organizations possess traditional First Amendment rights, even
though many of those organizations are international entities not entitled to First Amendment
rights.
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I.B then examines the unlawful advocacy and the true-threats doctrines that
arise within terrorist messaging.
A. The Challenge to the First Amendment
Terrorist organizations often broadcast ideological messages publicly in
order to build support for their movements by persuading recruits to join their
cause. Terrorists use their messages to communicate to a broad and—due to
the internet—often global audience.6 Evidence gathered pertaining to recent
domestic terror attacks indicates that this messaging may persuade certain
individuals to carry out violent attacks.7 Terrorist messaging is also used to
intimidate those who oppose or do not support terrorist aims. Terrorist
organizations aim to instill fear in targets of their attacks.8 By doing so, these
organizations seek to induce fear in a wide audience, amplifying their impact
beyond any single attack.9 Terrorists employ their communications to
perform the dual roles of persuading willing sympathizers and instilling fear
in potential victims. To the terrorists, these goals are by no means mutually
exclusive.
First Amendment scholars have offered a variety of responses to the
growth of terrorist messaging. These scholars can be divided into several
different camps. First, some scholars argue that the U.S. Supreme Court’s
current unlawful-advocacy doctrine adequately responds to the challenge
posed by terrorist messaging.10 Constitutional protection afforded to
unlawful advocacy is controlled by the highly protective standard established
in Brandenburg v. Ohio.11 The Court there held that unlawful advocacy is
protected except when the speech is “directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.”12
Scholars defend reliance on Brandenburg on the ground that the Constitution
guarantees robust protection for free speech, even unlawful advocacy.13
Although they differ regarding the particular values the First Amendment
protects, they agree that the First Amendment should protect the free

6. See generally GABRIEL WEIMANN, TERROR ON THE INTERNET: THE NEW ARENA, THE
NEW CHALLENGES (2006).
7. See William Finnegan, Last Days: Preparing for the Apocalypse in San Bernardino,
NEW YORKER (Feb. 22, 2016), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/02/22/
preparing-for-apocalypse-in-san-bernardino [http://perma.cc/3KH6-T6V6] (discussing the
effect of terrorist organization propaganda on the radicalization of the terrorists who carried
out the San Bernardino shootings); see also Brendan I. Koerner, Why ISIS Is Winning the
Social Media War, WIRED (Mar. 2016), https://www.wired.com/2016/03/isis-winning-socialmedia-war-heres-beat/ [http://perma.cc/K6SN-6N5M].
8. See BRUCE HOFFMAN, INSIDE TERRORISM 40–41 (2006).
9. See id.
10. See, e.g., Thomas Healy, Brandenburg in a Time of Terror, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
655, 660 (2009).
11. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam). For additional discussion regarding the evolution
of unlawful-advocacy doctrine, see infra Part I.B.2
12. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
13. See, e.g., Lynn Adelman & Jon Deitrich, Extremist Speech and the Internet: The
Continuing Importance of Brandenburg, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 361, 363–64 (2010); Healy,
supra note 10, at 660.
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exchange of ideas, even objectionable or criminal ones. They assert that the
Constitution’s framers believed that the exchange of ideas can undermine
irrational and dangerous propositions.14 Scholars in this group generally
believe that America must risk the potentially harmful consequences of
terrorist messaging because restricting speech creates a greater harm.15 The
framers were not cowards, and allowing threatening speech to circulate is a
necessary cost of promoting free and open expression.16
Another group of scholars argues that the Supreme Court’s current
protections for unlawful advocacy may well be too protective of speech,
creating an undue risk to security.17 Professor Cass Sunstein falls into this
category.18 He finds Brandenburg’s utility diminished in light of the
“genuine risk of large numbers of deaths” that may be caused by terrorist
messaging.19 To reduce the risk of terrorist messaging contributing to masscasualty attacks, Sunstein proposed that the Court adopt a far less protective
approach: “If (and only if) people are explicitly inciting violence, perhaps
their speech doesn’t deserve protection when (and only when) it produces a
genuine risk to public safety, whether imminent or not.”20 Sunstein’s
proposal revokes Brandenburg’s imminence requirement in order to remove
constitutional protection from most advocacy of unlawful conduct.
Finally, some scholars argue that terrorist messaging gives rise to unique
challenges, so it is necessary to create terrorism-specific exceptions to
otherwise strong free speech protection.21 They propose highly speechrestrictive approaches to combat terrorist messaging. For example, Eric
Posner advocates “anti-propaganda” laws
that make[] it a crime to access websites that glorify, express support for,
or provide encouragement for ISIS or support recruitment by ISIS; to
14. These scholars, to support their position, typically rely on ideas expressed by Justice
Louis Brandeis. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring).
15. See William W. Van Alstyne, Remarks of William Van Alstyne on the Brandenburg
Panel, 44 TEX. TECH L. REV. 85, 88 (2011) (“I frankly have seen nothing, including the
terrorism acts of 9/11 and its aftermath, that should cause one to regard [the Brandenburg test]
as less appropriate for our time than the very troubled time it finally came of age.”); see also
Adelman, supra note 13, at 363–64; Healy, supra note 10, at 660.
16. Justice Brandeis’s concurring opinion in Whitney offers support for this proposition,
as well. See Whitney, 274 U.S. at 377 (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“Those who won our
independence by revolution were not cowards. They did not fear political change. They did
not exalt order at the cost of liberty. To courageous, self-reliant men, with confidence in the
power of free and fearless reasoning applied through the processes of popular government, no
danger flowing from speech can be deemed clear and present, unless the incidence of the evil
apprehended is so imminent that it may befall before there is opportunity for full discussion.”).
17. See Cass R. Sunstein, Islamic State’s Challenge to Free Speech, BLOOMBERG (Nov.
23, 2015), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2015-11-23/islamic-state-s-challengeto-free-speech [http://perma.cc/XUB2-53LY].
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. This approach parallels the manner in which certain scholars responded to the
challenges presented by Communism. See, e.g., Carl A. Auerbach, The Communist Control
Act of 1954: A Proposed Legal-Political Theory of Free Speech, 23 U. CHI. L. REV. 173, 173
(1956).
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distribute links to those websites or videos, images, or text taken from those
websites; or to encourage people to access such websites by supplying them
with links or instructions.22

Scholars in this camp believe that the threatening messages terrorist
organizations disseminate are of such low social value23 and may produce
“historic and unprecedented danger from foreign radicalization and
recruitment”24 that draconian censorship is required.
Ultimately, none of these camps persuasively articulates a rationale for
either maintaining or modifying current First Amendment doctrine in light of
the First Amendment challenges posed by terrorist organizations. On the one
hand, scholars who argue for an exception from traditionally protective
standards due to the supposed uniqueness of the current threats risk
abandonment of protection during all periods of public fear. On the other
hand, no one can seriously doubt that terrorist messaging can influence
individuals to carry out attacks. It is, of course, principled to believe that we
should ignore the possible consequences of terrorist messaging in the name
of fostering free speech. But this attitude appears cavalier in light of the
harmful consequences of terrorist messaging. Even if, as Justice Louis
Brandeis famously informed us, the framers would not have cowered before
such speech,25 it is still not unreasonable to seek to limit this harmful
messaging.
Yet, extreme restrictions on unlawful advocacy or draconian censorship
are not appropriate responses. History demonstrates that, during pathological
periods of national paranoia, America tends to severely restrict free speech
in response to perceived threats.26 These harsh restrictions are inconsistent
with the democratic values underlying the First Amendment.27 Intelligently
reforming the current approach to terrorist messaging requires a more
nuanced response. This response must be able to blend two wholly distinct
free speech doctrines: unlawful advocacy and the “true threat.”
B. Doctrinal Background
Advocacy of criminal conduct often implicates two related but distinct
First Amendment doctrines. The first doctrine consists of cases concerning

22. Eric Posner, ISIS Gives Us No Choice but to Consider Limits on Speech, SLATE (Dec.
15, 2015), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/view_from_chicago/2015/12/
isis_s_online_radicalization_efforts_present_an_unprecedented_danger.html
[http://perma.cc/WVK3-XMXT].
23. Id. (“The major justification for freedom of speech is the marketplace of ideas—the
claim that if people can say whatever they want, the best ideas will flourish. But just what is
it that we can learn from ISIS? The social value of beheading apostates? The finer points of
crucifixion? Those who regard free speech as fundamental need to consider whether legal
principles that arose centuries ago make sense in the age of Snapchat.”).
24. Id.
25. Cf. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“Those
who won our independence by revolution were not cowards.”).
26. See MARTIN H. REDISH, THE LOGIC OF PERSECUTION: FREE EXPRESSION AND THE
MCCARTHY ERA 46–62 (2005).
27. Id.
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First Amendment protections for advocacy of unlawful conduct. The second
is the “true threats” doctrine. To varying degrees, terrorist messaging
implicates each of these distinct doctrines.
1. Unlawful-Advocacy Doctrine
The degree of First Amendment protection afforded to unlawful advocacy
has fluctuated over the past century.28 Such speech has at times received
broad protection while at others received very limited protection. The
Supreme Court in Schenck v. United States29 first established a test to
determine when unlawful advocacy may be censored in compliance with the
First Amendment. In that case, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes established
the “clear and present danger” test.30 Superficially, the test provided
substantial protection to unlawful advocacy. Yet in practice, the test was
often invoked to justify the government’s suppression of unpopular speech,
even when it presented no realistic danger of harm.31 The Court subsequently
modified the test in Gitlow v. New York32 in favor of an approach highly
deferential to the legislative judgment regarding the appropriateness of
prohibiting unlawful advocacy.33
Soon after, Justice Brandeis’s concurring opinion in Whitney v.
California34 explained the conditions under which unlawful advocacy
deserved constitutional protection. He recognized that,
although the rights of free speech and assembly are fundamental, they are
not in their nature absolute. Their exercise is subject to restriction, if the
particular restriction proposed is required in order to protect the state from
destruction or from serious injury, political, economic or moral. That the
necessity which is essential to a valid restriction does not exist unless
speech would produce, or is intended to produce, a clear and imminent
danger of some substantive evil which the state constitutionally may seek
to prevent has been settled.35

Brandeis’s concurrence envisioned a highly speech-protective approach to
unlawful advocacy: censoring unlawful advocacy is permitted when and
only when such restrictions are necessary to “protect the state from

28. This Part provides a brief history of the unlawful-advocacy line of cases. For a more
detailed discussion of the history and evolution of the doctrine, see generally Kent Greenawalt,
Speech and Crime, 4 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 645 (1980); Martin H. Redish, Advocacy of
Unlawful Conduct and the First Amendment: In Defense of Clear and Present Danger, 70
CALIF. L. REV. 1159, 1164 (1982).
29. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
30. Id. at 52.
31. See Martin H. Redish, Unlawful Advocacy and Free Speech Theory: Rethinking the
Lessons of the McCarthy Era, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 9, 60 (2004).
32. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
33. Greenawalt, supra note 28, at 705. This highly deferential standard was “on occasion
referred to as the ‘bad tendency’ test: if there was any possibility that the feared harm might
occur as a result of the prohibited words, the legislation would be upheld.” Redish, supra note
31, at 61 (footnote omitted).
34. 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
35. Id. at 373 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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destruction or serious injury.”36 The speaker must intend for this speech to
produce such a harm. And there must be a “clear and imminent danger” of
the harm coming about. Despite Brandeis’s speech-protective approach to
unlawful advocacy, the Court did not incorporate such broad protections into
its unlawful-advocacy doctrine for many years.
In Dennis v. United States,37 the Court’s plurality opinion further refined
the unlawful-advocacy doctrine by revising the “clear and present danger”
test.38 Chief Justice Fred Vinson’s plurality opinion adopted the statement
of the test as announced by Chief Judge Learned Hand in the court of appeals
below: “In each case [courts] must ask whether the gravity of the ‘evil,’
discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is
necessary to avoid the danger.”39 This approach rejected the true clear and
imminent danger standard advocated by Justice Brandeis in favor of one that
permitted the government to regulate the advocacy of seriously harmful
unlawful conduct, even if it would take place far in the future.
In 1969, the Supreme Court in Brandenburg substantially revised
controlling unlawful-advocacy doctrine. The Court held that the First
Amendment establishes
the principle that the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press
do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or
of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such
action.40

The Court found abstract teaching of the “moral necessity for a resort to force
and violence” distinct from preparing a group to commit criminal action.41
It held that even speech advocating violence should receive First Amendment
protection absent a disqualifying risk that the speech would cause imminent
harm.42
The Court in Brandenburg was correct in providing substantial—albeit not
absolute—protection for advocacy of unlawful conduct. Justice Brandeis’s
concurring opinion in Whitney details the rationales for protecting unlawful
advocacy.43 First, Justice Brandeis noted the value the framers placed on
providing citizens the independence to develop their faculties and deliberate
without fear of government censorship.44 Deliberation among citizens
protects against “the dissemination of noxious doctrine.”45 Unlawful
advocacy, “however reprehensible morally, is not a justification for denying

36. Id.
37. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
38. See Redish, supra note 31, at 47.
39. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 510 (plurality opinion) (quoting United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d
201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950)).
40. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam).
41. Id. at 448 (quoting Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 297–98 (1961)).
42. Id.
43. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
44. Id.
45. Id.
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free speech where the advocacy falls short of incitement and there is nothing
to indicate that the advocacy would be immediately acted on.”46
Punishing unlawful advocacy invites speaker self-censorship and therefore
undermines the democratic values the First Amendment is designed to serve.
While an absolutist would presumably reject any limitation on unlawful
advocacy, one need not go that far to conclude that unlawful advocacy should
be protected, at least in the absence of a threat of imminent harm. This
appears to be the controlling doctrine.
2. True-Threats Doctrine
In contrast to unlawful advocacy, true threats are categorically excluded
from constitutional protection. The Court first recognized the concept of true
threat in Watts v. United States.47 It observed: “a statute such as this one,
which makes criminal a form of pure speech, must be interpreted with the
commands of the First Amendment clearly in mind. What is a threat must be
distinguished from what is constitutionally protected speech.”48 Yet the
Court in Watts did not articulate its rationale for why true threats failed to
qualify as protected speech.
In R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,49 the Court provided a rationale for why true
threats are categorically excluded from First Amendment protection. There,
the Court held unconstitutional an ordinance regulating speech based on its
content.50 Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the majority, noted that “threats
of violence are outside the First Amendment” for the following three reasons:
“protecting individuals from the fear of violence, from the disruption that fear
engenders, and from the possibility that the threatened violence will occur.”51
Justice Scalia cited Watts as support for these propositions.52
The Court in Virginia v. Black53 further clarified the concept of a true
threat and the rationales for denying First Amendment protection to true
threats. The Court first explained that the “hallmark of the protection of free
speech is to allow ‘free trade in ideas’—even ideas that the overwhelming
majority of people might find distasteful or discomforting.”54 Despite this
apparent commitment to the free exchange of ideas, the First Amendment
does not guarantee absolute protection for speech; the government may
constitutionally regulate certain categories of expression.55 One such
category includes “true threats.”56 The Court defined “true threats” as those

46. Id. at 376.
47. 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (per curiam).
48. Id. at 707.
49. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
50. Id. at 391.
51. Id. at 388.
52. Id. (citing Watts, 394 U.S. at 707).
53. 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
54. Id. at 358 (quoting Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting)).
55. Id. (citing Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989)).
56. Id. at 359; see also R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 388; Watts, 394 U.S. at 705.
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“statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression
of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual
or group of individuals.”57 The Court then repeated the rationales from
R.A.V. for excluding true threats from the scope of First Amendment
protection.58
3. Rationalizing the Exclusion of True Threats
Despite the Court’s occasional efforts to justify exclusion of true threats
from First Amendment protection, it appears to have failed to grasp the
fundamental justification for its categorical rejection of free speech
protection. Simply put, a true threat is a coercive act, not speech. The First
Amendment does not protect every use of words. It protects the right of the
speaker to voluntarily express herself in order to persuade a willing listener
to adopt a certain belief or take a certain action. Using speech in this fashion
is properly characterized as expression. Promoting free and open exchange
of expressive speech is essential to promoting a vibrant democracy in which
individuals are able to think and speak as they please, without fear of
government censorship. Protection of expressive speech advances individual
self-realization, the core value the First Amendment is designed to promote.
Unlike expressive speech, a “speech-act” involves the use of words to
accomplish ends other than to inform or to persuade a willing listener to
freely adopt a certain belief or take a certain action.59 This is especially true
when speech is used to perform a coercive act. For example, a mugger
brandishing a gun who shouts “your money or your life” at a victim engages
in a nonexpressive speech-act.60 Although the mugger used his vocal cord,
what he uttered was not speech, at least in the sense contemplated by the First
Amendment. The mugger did not attempt to persuade a willing listener to
voluntarily hand over his money. Instead, the mugger’s words constituted an
act. In effect, his words are the equivalent of hitting the victim over his head
and taking his wallet. The mugger used words but only as a coercive tool in
the execution of his robbery. Thus, the mugger’s speech is properly
characterized as a nonexpressive speech-act because the speech is itself an
act. It is for these reasons that such coercive speech-acts as blackmail and
extortion are categorically excluded from the scope of constitutional
protection.
As a normative matter, coercive speech-acts are excluded from First
Amendment protection because they do not advance the democratic values
the First Amendment exists to protect. To the contrary, they directly
undermine those values. The First Amendment promotes individual selfrealization by establishing a societal commitment to the free and open

57. Id.
58. Id. (citing R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 388); see also Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001,
2016 (2015).
59. See Redish, supra note 31, at 85.
60. Id. at 69.
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exchange of ideas.61 To this end, the individual must be empowered to freely
decide what to say, what to think, and, within legally imposed limits, how to
act. This is “central to a respect for one’s autonomy and integrity as a
person.”62
From this, it follows that individuals may attempt to persuade others to
adopt a certain belief or take certain action. But individuals may not rely on
the First Amendment to protect efforts to force others to think or act a certain
way. Coercive speech-acts do not contribute to the free and open exchange
of ideas that underpins a robust public sphere. They “manifestly disregard[]”
the listener’s will and “the integrity of the [listener]’s mental processes.”63
Whatever subsequent belief the listener adopts is the product of the speaker’s
coercive nonexpressive speech-act, not the listener’s autonomous decisionmaking process.
True threats, then, are not excluded from the First Amendment because—
as the Court has occasionally suggested—the harm they cause outweighs
their expressive value. They are denied protection because they are properly
viewed not as “speech” at all, at least in the sense contemplated by the First
Amendment, but rather as coercive speech-acts.
II. “TERRORIZING ADVOCACY” AND THE
CHALLENGE TO FREE SPEECH DOCTRINE
Terrorizing advocacy raises complications that challenge the First
Amendment. Part II.A discusses how the two doctrines of criminal speech
are not mutually exclusive, as courts consistently—and incorrectly—assume.
Part II.B then explains how terrorizing advocacy is actually a hybrid of both
unlawful-advocacy and true-threat doctrines. Part II.C uses the prior
discussions of the mutual exclusivity fallacy of terrorizing advocacy and
sheds light on the implications of this fallacy in the courts.
A. The Fallacy of Mutual Exclusivity
The unlawful-advocacy and true-threats doctrines have evolved in separate
First Amendment universes. All of the Supreme Court’s true-threats cases
involved directly coercive, first-party communications from speaker to
victim; no element of protected persuasive expression was involved.
Unlawful advocacy, however, is subject to the test outlined in Brandenburg,
and this advocacy is excluded from First Amendment protection only if it
gives rise to imminent danger.64

61. C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV.
964, 1001–02 (1978) (“Thus, the political morality summed up by the first amendment
requires protection for speech that manifests or contributes to the speaker’s values or visions—
speech which furthers the two key first amendment values of self-fulfillment and participation
in change—as long as the speech does not involve violence to or coercion of another.”).
62. Id. at 1000–01.
63. Id. at 1001.
64. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam); see also supra Part
I.B.1.
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Courts appear to assume these two doctrines are mutually exclusive. They
characterize criminal speech either as advocacy of unlawful conduct or as a
true threat.65 One example is the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Planned
Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. American Coalition of Life
Activists.66 The court considered whether messages that plaintiffs alleged
threatened specific doctors who performed abortions constituted true threats
and therefore lacked constitutional protection.67 Defendants argued that their
speech was protected political advocacy. The majority declared that “while
advocating violence is protected, threatening a person with violence is not.”68
It concluded that the speech in question fell under the true-threats line of
cases, and thus fell outside the scope of First Amendment protection.69
Dissenting judges, however, found the speech in question to be protected
advocacy of unlawful conduct.70 Both the majority and the dissents
considered the speech to be either protected unlawful advocacy or an
unprotected true threat.71
This binary approach to speech classification is problematic, because this
either-or method excludes the possibility of speech being both unlawful
advocacy and a true threat. This Article describes this analytical pitfall as
the fallacy of mutual exclusivity. Split decisions by appellate courts reflect
this analytical fallacy; one judge may view speech as unlawful advocacy,
while another may view the same speech as a true threat.72 For example, the
Ninth Circuit judges on both sides of the decision in American Coalition of
Life Activists failed to recognize that speech advocating violence could be
perceived as advocacy of unlawful conduct from the perspective of the
listeners yet simultaneously perceived as a threat from the perspective of the
targets who hear or read the speaker’s words.
Such an analytical fallacy necessarily distorts the analysis of the case.
How speech is categorized of course determines what—if any—First
Amendment protection it receives. If categorized as a true threat, expression
is automatically denied protection. Yet if categorized as unlawful advocacy,
the speech loses protection only if it gives rise to the danger of imminent
65. We agree with Professor Karst that “the doctrinal relationship of ‘advocacy’ to ‘threat’
does not pose an ‘either/or’ choice for judges.” Kenneth L. Karst, Threats and Meanings: How
the Facts Govern First Amendment Doctrine, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1337, 1390–91 (2006). Yet,
as we discuss, in practice judges proceed on the assumption that these two doctrines do pose
an either-or choice. See infra Part II.B.
66. 290 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
67. See infra Part III.
68. Am. Coal. of Life Activists, 290 F.3d at 1072 (recognizing that if the speakers “had
merely endorsed or encouraged the violent actions of others, [their] speech would be
protected”).
69. Id.
70. See id. at 1101 (Berzon, J., dissenting) (“[T]he speech for which the defendants are
being held liable . . . is, on its face, clearly, indubitably, and quintessentially the kind of
communication that is fully protected by the First Amendment.”).
71. For example, Judge Marsha Berzon, in dissent, stated that she “would police
vigorously the line between inducement and threats.” Id. at 1107.
72. Another example comes from United States v. Turner, 720 F.3d 411 (2d Cir. 2013),
where the majority and dissent disagreed about whether the speech in question constituted
unlawful advocacy or a true threat.
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injury.73 A court in a given case risks ignoring a harm or benefit if it forces
such a hybrid speech-act into a single category.
B. The Hybrid Nature of “Terrorizing Advocacy”
Terrorizing advocacy is properly seen as a mixture of protected speech and
unprotected acts.74 It does not fit neatly into either the unlawful-advocacy or
true-threats categories. Thus, it is necessary to treat terrorizing advocacy as
a hybrid category distinct from the traditional line of unlawful-advocacy and
true-threats cases.
In one sense, terrorizing advocacy is a form of expressive speech (unlawful
advocacy) because its aim is to persuade willing listeners to take unlawful
action. Focusing on this element, terrorizing advocacy would be properly
tested under the unlawful-advocacy line of cases. For example, it is
conceptually indisputable that publicly broadcasting the message that “all
Israelis living in Chicago should be killed” is a form of expressive unlawful
advocacy. The speaker is attempting to persuade willing listeners to engage
in a criminal act. Thus, absent the disqualifying danger of causing imminent
violence,75 this advocacy is properly deemed protected expression under
Brandenburg. However, focusing only on the persuasive element of
terrorizing advocacy ignores its coercively intimidating impact on unwilling
listeners.
Terrorizing advocacy simultaneously exhibits the pathologies of a true
threat. Public advocacy directed at persuading a willing listener to commit
violence against specific individuals or groups can intimidate unwilling
listeners or readers who are potential targets of that violence. However,
purely under the unlawful-advocacy line of cases, the coercive impact on an
unwilling listener would not be taken into account. Instead, only the physical
harm that may come about as a result of voluntary criminal actions taken by
the willing listeners is considered.76 Terrorizing advocacy recognizes how
expressive speech can simultaneously be used to coerce as well as persuade,
thus exhibiting the pathologies of both a true threat and unlawful advocacy.
Yet terrorizing advocacy cannot properly be categorized exclusively as a
traditional true threat. On the one hand, true threats typically involve what
can be characterized as first-party threats. That is, true threats involve
speakers issuing a threat of coercive behavior directly to unwilling listeners.
Speakers use words to coerce unwilling listeners because unwilling listeners
73. See Am. Coal. of Life Activists, 290 F.3d at 1091 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (“[A]
statement does not become a true threat because it instills fear in the listener.”); id. at 1095
(“[E]ven when public speech sounds menacing, even when it expressly calls for violence, it
cannot form the basis of liability unless it amounts to incitement or directly threatens actual
injury to particular individuals.”).
74. Although Professor Karst recognized that “some alleged threats . . . are mixed in with
speech that contains advocacy addressed to public issues,” he did not investigate this
phenomenon in great detail. Karst, supra note 65, at 1390. This Article is the first attempt to
perform such an analysis and propose corresponding modifications to free speech
jurisprudence.
75. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam).
76. Id.
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reasonably fear that the speaker will follow through on the threat.77 A slight
modification on the previous example clarifies this point: if a speaker were
to walk up to an Israeli living in Chicago and say, “I will murder all Israelis
who live in Chicago,” that constitutes a traditional true threat. The speaker
used words not to persuade but to intimidate directly an unwilling listener
because the unwilling listener reasonably fears that the speaker may commit
the harm. Terrorizing advocacy operates in a similar, but not identical,
fashion.
On the other hand, terrorizing advocacy involves what can be characterized
as third-party threats. A third-party threat involves a speaker publicly
attempting to persuade a willing listener to commit harm against an unwilling
listener. By publicly issuing the threat, the speaker presumably intends that
the unwilling listener hears and finds credible such a threat. And he is
simultaneously attempting to persuade willing listeners to take unlawful
action. Third-party threats share the pathologies of a first-party threat
because they can intimidate those unwilling listeners who are the targets of
the threat. The speaker uses words to intimidate indirectly an unwilling
listener; but the intimidation comes from the intended victim’s perception
that a willing listener may be persuaded to harm him. The unwilling listener
does not necessarily fear that the speaker will act; instead, he reasonably fears
that a third party may be persuaded by the speaker to act.
One might be tempted to conclude that the coercive element of terrorizing
advocacy should cause such expression to be treated exclusively as true
threats. After all, terrorizing advocacy gives rise to the very same
nonexpressive harms as do true threats. But while the harm of terrorizing
advocacy is fungible with the harm of true threats, the expressive value of the
two is by no means identical. Classic first-party true threats cannot even
properly be characterized as speech in the sense contemplated by the First
Amendment. No harm to First Amendment interests results from suppressing
true threats. Unlike classic true threats, terrorizing advocacy exhibits
qualities of fully protected speech. Harm to First Amendment interests does
result from suppression of such speech. To treat the two forms of true threat
identically, then, ignores the pure expressive element inherent in terrorizing
advocacy.
Messaging from the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) illustrates the
phenomenon of messaging that simultaneously seeks to threaten and
persuade. ISIS, through public channels such as social media and its online
magazine, disseminates messages advocating the murder of specific persons
or groups of people. Specifically, ISIS regularly urges the killing of infidels
and nonbelievers. Often, ISIS does not directly threaten these individuals;
ISIS instead makes normative claims that urge others to murder specified
targets. ISIS aims to persuade a willing listener—such as an ISIS
77. See Am. Coal. of Life Activists, 290 F.3d at 1091 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (“In order
for the statement to be a threat, it must send the message that the speakers themselves—or
individuals acting in concert with them—will engage in physical violence.”); see also id. at
1106 (Berzon, J., dissenting) (“[T]he separate constitutional category of unprotected speech
for threats does not include statements that induce fear of violence by third parties.”).
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sympathizer—to commit violent acts against those targets. For example,
ISIS’s propaganda magazine features the following exhortation:
Muslims currently living in Dar al-Kufr78 must be reminded that the blood
of the disbelievers is halal, and killing them is a form of worship to Allah,
the Lord, King, and God of mankind. This includes the businessman riding
to work in a taxicab, the young adults (post-pubescent “children”) engaged
in sports activities in the park, and the old man waiting in line to buy a
sandwich. Indeed, even the blood of the kafir79 street vendor selling
flowers to those passing by is halal to shed—and striking terror into the
hearts of all disbelievers is a Muslim’s duty.80

Through this, ISIS tries to persuade willing listeners to act by reminding
them that killing businessmen, young adults, the elderly, and merchants—
that is, “all disbelievers”—is a Muslim’s sacred duty.81 Thus, ISIS aims to
persuade sympathizers to commit violence against disbelievers. In doing so,
ISIS issues third-party threats. This messaging is not a direct threat against
a specific target—that is, through this message, ISIS does not claim that it as
an organization will attack the disbelievers. Instead, ISIS attempts to
persuade its potential sympathizers—willing listeners—to harm specific
targets. The declared targets of ISIS’s messaging—unwilling listeners—who
are aware of this message may reasonably fear that they will be attacked.82
Even if the messaging fails to persuade anyone to attack those declared
targets, ISIS’s messaging can still succeed in inducing fear in those targets.
ISIS’s history of persuading its sympathizers to commit attacks against
specific groups of people whom it declares to be enemies makes this fear
particularly reasonable. This messaging performs a hybrid role by attempting
to persuade willing sympathizers to commit violence while inducing fear in
those who may be targeted by this violence. Analytically, messaging of this
sort should be characterized as terrorizing advocacy.
C. The Mutual Exclusivity Fallacy in the Courts
The courts have consistently applied this form of fallacious mutual
exclusivity in approaching third-party threats. The Second Circuit in United
States v. Turner,83 for example, applied the assumption of mutual exclusivity

78. Dar al-Kufr, translated, essentially means the “land of disbelief.” ABU ISMAEL ALBEIRAWI, ESSAYS ON IJTIHAD IN THE 21ST CENTURY 98 (2016).
79. Kafir, translated, essentially means nonbeliever. Id. at 23.
80. Al Hayat Media Center, The Kafir’s Blood Is Halal for You, So Shed It, RUMIYAH,
2016, at 36, https://www.clarionproject.org/factsheets-files/Rumiyah-ISIS-Magazine-1stissue.pdf [http://perma.cc/4XWM-X5NE]. Al Hayat Media Center is the foreign language
media division of ISIS.
81. Id.
82. Admittedly, most Americans do not read ISIS’s terror magazine. But the magazine is
publicly available, widely distributed, and often receives media coverage. So, even if a
potential target does not read the actual magazine, he or she may still become aware of the
threat—as ISIS likely intended with its decision to put the magazine on the internet, where it
is publicly available. By posting the message through such a medium, ISIS can build support
for its own cause and generate fear through the public circulation of these threats.
83. 720 F.3d 411 (2d Cir. 2013).
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in determining the level of First Amendment protection afforded to a blog
post by an internet media personality that included violent language directed
at three Seventh Circuit judges for an opinion concerning the scope of the
Second Amendment.84 The defendant operated a publicly accessible website
that appealed to white supremacist groups.85 His post included the following
statement: “These Judges deserve to be killed. Their blood will replenish
the tree of liberty. A small price to pay to assure freedom for millions.”86
Turner remarked:
These Judges are traitors to the United States of America. They have
intentionally violated the Constitution. . . . These Judges deserve to [be]
made such an example of as to send a message to the entire judiciary: Obey
the Constitution or die.87

Turner updated his blog post the following day, adding information about the
target judges including their names and photographs, their work addresses,
and a map of the courthouse.88 The Second Circuit concluded that Turner’s
speech was properly characterized as a true threat and thus lacked First
Amendment protection.89
In reaching this conclusion, the court failed to recognize the hybrid nature
of Turner’s speech. On one hand, the court correctly recognized that Turner’s
intended victims could reasonably perceive the blog post as a coercive threat.
In this regard Turner’s blog post contained an intimidating, coercive element
not protected by the First Amendment. The post induced fear in the judges
and sought to coerce them into deciding future cases in accordance with
Turner’s wishes. The court categorized the blog post as a true threat, even
though the post was not a traditional first-party threat. Instead, the post
constituted a third-party threat: Turner, the speaker, attempted to persuade
willing listeners to murder unwilling targets—the judges—which
simultaneously had the effect of coercively intimidating the judges. The
Court however, did not discuss the difficulty of fitting a third-party threat
into the true-threat line of cases.
The court’s failure was problematic because Turner’s post, while clearly
containing a threat element, simultaneously constituted protected expressive
speech under Brandenburg. Turner defended his speech on the ground that
his post was an act of political speech in which he expressed his strong
opposition to the Seventh Circuit’s ruling regarding the scope of the Second
Amendment.90 He had expressed opposition to the Seventh Circuit’s
decision and had urged readers to commit unlawful acts.91 Turner’s post was
likely intended to persuade willing listeners to kill specific judges. The court
even recognized that “Turner was constitutionally entitled to condemn and
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

See generally id.
Id. at 414.
Id. at 415.
Id.
Id. at 414.
Id. at 424–25.
Id. at 420.
Id. at 420–23.
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disparage the Seventh Circuit.”92 Judge Rosemary Pooler, dissenting,
recognized that Turner’s statements were aimed at persuading willing
listeners, leading her to conclude that his statements constituted protected
unlawful advocacy.93 But the majority rejected this conclusion on the basis
of the following reasoning:
Turner’s political criticism was not the basis for his conviction. Rather, he
was convicted of doing something more—of threatening the lives of three
judges . . . . The evidence was more than sufficient, moreover, for a jury to
conclude that Turner’s statements were not “political hyperbole,” as he
contended, but violent threats against the judges’ lives.
....
The full context of Turner’s remarks reveals a gravity readily
distinguishable from mere hyperbole or common public discourse.94

Even though the court apparently recognized the speech’s expressive and
political nature, it concluded that the threatening nature of the speech
nullified any First Amendment protection that the speech may have deserved.
The Ninth Circuit in American Coalition of Life Activists confronted the
issue of whether the defendants issued prolife messages that violated a
federal statute prohibiting threats against abortion providers.95 The court was
called upon to determine whether certain messages constituted threats
appropriately excluded from First Amendment coverage. Defendants issued
three messages: First, “the Deadly Dozen ‘GUILTY’ poster which identifies
[two plaintiffs who are doctors] among ten others”;96 second, a “GUILTY”
poster featuring the name, addresses, and photograph of another reproductive
services provider;97 and third, the “Nuremburg Files” website, which
included a compilation of doctors that provide abortion services.98 The court
described the Nuremburg Files website in the following manner:
Approximately 200 people are listed under the label “ABORTIONISTS:
the shooters,” and 200 more are listed under Files for judges, politicians,
law enforcement, spouses, and abortion rights supporters. [Three plaintiff
doctors] are listed in the “abortionists” section, which bears the legend:
“Black font (working); Greyed-out Name (wounded); Strikethrough
(fatality).” The names of [recently murdered abortion doctors] are struck
through.99

92. Id. at 420. Whether Turner’s right to criticize the judges deserved First Amendment
protection would still be subject to the Brandenburg imminence test. See Brandenburg v. Ohio,
395 U.S. 444, 444–47 (1969) (per curiam).
93. See Turner, 720 F.3d at 434 (Pooler, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 421.
95. Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coal. of Life Activists,
290 F.3d 1058, 1064 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
96. Id. at 1062.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1065.
99. Id.
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The court concluded that these messages constituted unprotected true
threats.100
As in Turner, the majority failed to recognize the hybrid nature of the
posters and Nuremburg Files website. The court correctly concluded that the
targeted abortion doctors could reasonably consider the posters and website
threatening.101 Similar posters used previously by prolife activists also
named specific abortion doctors, and after the dissemination of these past
posters the doctors targeted on the posters were murdered.102 It was
conceivable that the posters persuaded individuals to carry out those murders.
At the very least, due to these past murders, “the poster format itself had
acquired currency as a death threat for abortion providers.”103 The majority
asserted that the prolife activists should have recognized that producing
posters depicting specific doctors would intimidate those doctors, causing
them to fear that they may be future targets of violence.104
The majority also failed to recognize that the posters and website
simultaneously constituted expressive, persuasive speech. To be sure, the
court considered the possibility that the posters were a form of protected
expression.105 But the court reasoned that the intimidating nature of the
posters went “well beyond the political message (regardless of what one
thinks of it) that abortionists are killers who deserve death too.”106 Thus, the
posters exceeded the bounds of permissible, persuasive advocacy and instead
constituted constitutionally proscribable threats. In reaching such a
conclusion, the majority seemed to assume that it had to make an either-or
choice: the messages were either persuasive advocacy or a true threat.
Like the Second Circuit in Turner, the Ninth Circuit incorrectly assumed
expressive mutual exclusivity by concluding that the messaging could not
simultaneously be characterized as both a true threat and unlawful advocacy.
The posters, even if a form of intimidation, also carried political messages

100. To the extent that the posters and Nuremburg Files website constitute threats, they
appear to be third-party threats. The American Coalition of Life Activists who produced these
messages may have intended simultaneously to attempt to persuade sympathizers to murder
these doctors and to intimidate the targeted doctors. The Ninth Circuit majority ignored the
third-party element of the threat. Instead, the Ninth Circuit majority treated the messages as
if they were first-party threats. See id. at 1085 (“Physicians could well believe that ACLA
would make good on the threat.”). The court failed to acknowledge that the targeted doctors
may fear that the posters may inspire prolife sympathizers who are not members of the ACLA
to murder the doctors, as happened with previous posters of this nature. See id. at 1079–80.
101. The majority reached this conclusion despite the fact that it was “literally true” that
“the posters contain[ed] no language that is a threat.” Id. at 1072. Instead of relying on the
literal language of the messages, the Ninth Circuit examined the context and medium used to
communicate the message to find the posters to be true threats. See id. at 1078 (“Indeed,
context is critical in a true threats case and history can give meaning to the medium.”).
102. Id. at 1079–80.
103. Id. at 1079.
104. Id. at 1085–86 (“[N]o one putting [the plaintiff doctors] on a ‘wanted’-type poster, or
participating in selecting these particular abortion providers for such a poster or publishing it,
could possibly believe anything other than that each would be seriously worried about being
next in line to be shot and killed.”).
105. Id. at 1079.
106. See id. at 1079–80.
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designed to persuade willing listeners. The intimidating features of the
posters and the Nuremburg Files website were inseparable from the political
context in which these messages were deployed: fervent prolife advocacy.
Judge Alex Kozinski, in dissent, found that the “defendants’ speech, on its
face, is political speech on an issue that is at the cutting edge of moral and
political debate in our society.”107 To him, the posters “were unquestionably
of a political nature” and featured publicly available information “in a format
designed to convey a political viewpoint and to achieve political goals.”108
The majority, however, by establishing at the outset of its analysis an eitheror choice between viewing the speech as protected unlawful advocacy or as
an unprotected true threat, ultimately rejected the speech as protected
expression.
The majority should have instead recognized that the posters were
expressive statements that were “designed both to rally political support for
the views espoused by defendants, and to intimidate plaintiffs and others like
them into desisting abortion-related activities.”109 The posters were a hybrid
of both political speech (vehement opposition to abortion) and third-party
threat (thinly veiled death threats designed to intimidate doctors into not
performing abortions). As such, the messages exemplify the hybrid nature
of terrorizing advocacy.
III. RESHAPING FIRST AMENDMENT DOCTRINE
TO DEAL WITH TERRORIZING ADVOCACY
We propose reshaping First Amendment doctrine to account for the hybrid
nature of terrorizing advocacy. Essentially, our proposed model mirrors the
recognition by terrorist organizations that persuasive advocacy can
simultaneously perform a coercive function. Coercive speech-acts do not
receive First Amendment protection because they definitionally and
normatively fall outside the purview of the First Amendment. First-party
threats are not protected speech because they do not attempt to persuade or
inform a willing listener. Instead, threats aim to coerce an unwilling listener,
either by instilling fear or forcing him to take a certain action. Such threats
are anathema to the democratic values the First Amendment is designed to
promote. But as previously noted, the complication in the context of
terrorizing advocacy is that the threat is couched in expressive words
designed to persuade willing listeners to act. The government has a
legitimate interest in constitutionally regulating speech-acts as a regulation
of conduct, even when such a regulation incidentally restricts free expression.
But, to avoid impermissibly burdening free expression, the proper First
Amendment response must be narrowly tailored. Thus, the definition of what
can be characterized as terrorizing advocacy should be narrow.
Because terrorizing advocacy is a hybrid of expression and conduct, it
seems to follow logically that terrorizing advocacy should be tested under the
107. Id. at 1097 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 1092.
109. Id. at 1093 (emphasis added).
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intermediate scrutiny test the Supreme Court established for mixed
expression and conduct in United States v. O’Brien.110 But the Court has
failed to invalidate any infringements of speech under this intermediate
scrutiny standard. Thus, we propose an alternative model which gives more
attention to the protective value of the pure speech element. We can,
however, glean insight from O’Brien into why prohibiting terrorizing
advocacy is permissible, even where such an exclusion incidentally restricts
protected expression.
O’Brien supports the idea that when confronted with a situation of harmful
conduct inextricably intertwined with expressive speech, the government
may permissibly regulate or prohibit the conduct element. For the most part,
such a regulation is permissible even if it has the effect of incidentally
restricting otherwise protected expression.111 Specifically, the Court in
O’Brien held that a statute criminalizing the burning of a draft card did not
violate the First Amendment, even though such a statute had the incidental
effect of limiting O’Brien’s freedom of expression.112 Preventing the
disruption to the selective service system caused by burning a draft card was
held to justify the incidental restriction on the ability of people to express
themselves through such acts.113
Although this Article’s approach, like O’Brien’s, begins with recognition
of the expression’s hybrid nature, this Article does not endorse an approach
that allows government to restrict all advocacy simply because an expression
may also include a coercive, nonexpressive element. Instead, the proposed
approach protects advocacy that contains an element of a nonexpressive,
coercive speech-act but only if the speech involved satisfies certain strict
criteria.
Determining when terrorizing advocacy is properly excluded from First
Amendment protection must be done with care. An unduly vague definition
of unprotected terrorizing advocacy risks creating a situation where
government may adopt a broad definition that is underprotective of the
expressive value inherent in the expression. To that end, we refuse to define
terrorizing advocacy based upon the identity of the speaker; whether the
government defines the speaker as a “terrorist” or “terrorist organization”
should not affect whether the speech in question is characterized as
unprotected threat or protected persuasion. Such an approach could chill
individuals from advocating for unlawful conduct out of fear that the
government may characterize their speech as a threat. And this chilling effect
undermines the free exchange of ideas upon which democratic deliberation
depends.
The following set of five criteria aims to both clarify and narrowly define
what constitutes unprotected terrorizing advocacy. Each factor is intended to
110. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
111. Id. at 376 (“[W]hen ‘speech’ and ‘nonspeech’ elements are combined in the same
course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech
element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms.”).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 382.
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serve as a necessary condition for justifying suppression of terrorizing
advocacy.
A. Intentional Communication to Intended Victim
Suppression of terrorizing advocacy requires that the speaker intentionally
communicate a third-party threat to an intended victim of the advocacy. This
means that the speaker must communicate the third-party threat in such a way
or through such a medium that, even though the speech is not actually
directed at the victim, the speaker reasonably expects the unwilling listener—
that is, the target—to be made aware that the advocacy of harm has been
expressed. This factor is essential because excluding terrorizing advocacy
from First Amendment protection is justified largely on the ground that it has
been designed to instill fear in the target. If the target is not made aware of
the speech, then the speech cannot intimidate the target. If the advocacy does
not induce fear, then that advocacy does not share the pathologies of a true
threat. And there is no longer a principled basis for categorically excluding
that speech from First Amendment coverage. Thus, where the speaker could
not reasonably be expected to know that an intended victim was likely to hear
or read the speaker’s advocacy of violence against him, the speaker cannot
be deemed to have intended to threaten the victim.
Determining whether the speaker intentionally communicated what
amounts to a third-party threat to the intended victim should be based on an
objective evaluation of the speaker’s reasonable beliefs. If the speaker were
to communicate a terrorizing message through a publicly accessible medium,
then it is reasonable for a court to infer that the speaker intended that the
target be made aware of the message. Indeed, by definition, third-party
threats are designed to persuade willing listeners to act and simultaneously
to induce fear in targets. Courts could reasonably assume that a speaker’s
decision to choose certain public channels to communicate terrorizing
advocacy was designed to reach the intended victims as well as willing
listeners.
Courts should treat messaging conveyed through public channels such as
online or print media, radio or television broadcasts, public websites, internet
forums, or publicly accessible social media channels as intended to
communicate a threat to a target. Terrorist organizations’ public circulation
of terrorizing advocacy through online magazines, Turner’s public blog post,
and the American Coalition of Life Activists’ public display of posters during
prolife rallies and creation of a publicly accessible website all exemplify
speaker choices that satisfy this intentionality requirement. A court
evaluating any of these situations could reasonably infer that the speaker
chose a publicly accessible medium, intending that the target would perceive
the message. But if a speaker were to post a message on a private social
media page or to verbalize a threat during a private gathering, then a court
should not automatically conclude that the speaker intended to communicate
a threat to the target.
One could raise the counterargument that this requirement of intentional
communication creates an illogical loophole where privately issued threats
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receive full First Amendment protection, yet publicly issued threats receive
no protection. At first glance, this would seem to run counter to First
Amendment doctrine’s commitment to promoting robust, wide-open, public
expression. Yet, as explained previously, terrorizing advocacy is not the pure
expressive speech that the First Amendment aims to protect. Instead,
terrorizing advocacy also includes a coercive speech-act that is anathema to
core democratic values underlying the First Amendment. The public
performance of such a coercive speech-act will generally be essential to
inducing fear in the target. Additionally, privately issued exhortations to
commit violence against specific persons do not receive absolute First
Amendment protection. Private speech of that sort is—and should continue
to be—subject to the existing Brandenburg doctrine that governs advocacy
of unlawful conduct.114
B. Unambiguous Communication of Unlawful Advocacy
The speaker must unambiguously advocate criminal behavior in order for
a communication to be characterized as unprotected terrorizing advocacy.
This requirement draws on an approach advocated by Judge Learned Hand
many years ago in his famed district court decision in Masses Pub. Co. v.
Patten.115 There, Judge Hand concluded that the First Amendment does not
protect the “direct” advocacy of criminal behavior but does protect such
advocacy when it is implied or indirect.116 “Direct” advocacy of criminal
behavior requires the speaker in no uncertain terms to have advocated the
commission of an unlawful act.117 In other words, the advocacy of unlawful
conduct must be apparent from the four corners of the language used by the
speaker.
Judge Hand’s approach as the sole measure of protection for unlawful
advocacy for which it was intended suffers from numerous serious flaws.118
But in the limited context of separating protected from unprotected
terrorizing advocacy, the approach has much to recommend it. In the context
of pure unlawful advocacy, it is questionable whether such a sharp distinction
should be drawn between explicit and implied unlawful advocacy. But in the
case of terrorizing advocacy, where under Brandenburg’s imminence test the
expressive element of such advocacy deserves full constitutional protection,
the scope of a speaker’s right is more limited.
In order to justify punishment of otherwise fully protected advocacy,
government should be required to establish the unambiguous threat of
unlawful harm to a third party on the face of the speaker’s statement. This
requirement is designed to make clear to the speaker, listener, and reviewing
114. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam).
115. 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y.), rev’d, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917).
116. Id. at 540 (“If one stops short of urging upon others that it is their duty or their interest
to resist the law, it seems to me one should not be held to have attempted to cause its
violation.”); id. at 540–41 (finding that the plain meaning of the language in question did not
advocate criminal activity).
117. Patten, 244 F. at 540–41.
118. See Redish, supra note 28, at 1187–89.
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courts that speech must clearly threaten a specific target to be considered
unprotected terrorizing advocacy. This requirement clarifies for speakers
what sort of speech lacks First Amendment protection, thereby avoiding
situations where speakers may be chilled from engaging in lawful speech out
of fear that their words may be found to be a threat by a court or listener who
misunderstands or misinterprets the speaker’s words. This requirement also
aims to prevent sensitive listeners, who may perceive harsh language as
threatening, from being allowed to censor too broad a range of speech.
A requirement that the threat be apparent from the four corners of the
speech is vulnerable to the counterargument that it ignores veiled or indirect
threats. This is a valid concern. A speaker may use nonthreatening language
to communicate a message, but, based on tone, word choice, or context, the
speaker may communicate that message in a threatening fashion.119 Our
approach to terrorizing advocacy would not prohibit speakers from
intimidating targets through veiled threats. We recognize that these veiled
threats may have the same coercive effect on the listener as a direct threat.
On balance, however, extending the prohibition to encompass veiled threats
is undesirable. Including veiled threats in the purview of prohibited
terrorizing advocacy casts too wide a net; innocuous speech may easily be
misinterpreted as a veiled threat by a listener or a court. Categorically
excluding veiled third-party threats from First Amendment protection and
inviting searching judicial inquiry into the speakers’ intended meaning of her
words may have too damaging an impact on expressive speech. At the same
time, speakers would not have carte blanche to issue veiled threats. Courts
could address those veiled threats under the existing Brandenburg doctrine
to determine whether the veiled threat should receive First Amendment
protection.120 Also, veiled first-party threats, whether direct or indirect,
should still be deemed beyond the scope of First Amendment protection.
C. Genuine Threat
After finding that a speaker has intentionally and unambiguously
communicated a threat, the next issue is whether the threat should reasonably
be perceived by the victim as concrete and genuine. Whether the speech in
question represents a concrete threat should be measured by an inquiry into
the reasonable belief of the intended victim. That is, the listener must possess
a reasonable fear that the speaker’s words will persuade a willing listener to
carry out the threat. This inquiry is essential to ensuring that only genuine
threats are excluded from protection. Absent this limitation, courts might
subsume within the category of unprotected threats those statements that are
merely expressions of abstract advocacy or hyperbole.121
119. This concern has been referred to as the Marc Antony funeral oration problem: Marc
Antony, during his funeral oration in Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar, “praised” Brutus in such a
way that he actually roused listeners to harm Brutus. See Martin H. Redish, supra note 31, at
75.
120. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam).
121. Theoretically, the situation could arise where it may be objectively reasonable for a
listener to fear the speaker’s threat, yet there may be evidence that the listener subjectively did
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Determining whether a listener should reasonably fear a third-party threat
is a difficult process. This evaluation can be informed by the context in which
the words are spoken both in terms of the identity of the speaker and the
surrounding circumstances.122 The identity of the speaker matters insofar as
there may be a history of a speaker’s advocacy causing—or at least
contributing to—subsequent physical harm. On the one hand, for example,
a threat issued by a terrorist leader with a history of followers who commit
violence based on his commands would more reasonably inspire fear in
someone targeted by the leader’s threat. On the other hand, a threat issued
by an anonymous internet commentator absent proof that his words have
persuaded anyone to commit violence would be less likely to inspire fear in
a reasonable listener.
The surrounding circumstances also matter. Evaluating context can help
prevent hyperbolic or satirical statements from being deemed genuine threats.
For example, a threat issued by a comedian during a stand-up routine should
not inspire fear in a reasonable listener. By contrast, a threat issued by a Ku
Klux Klansman during a public rally in support of white nationalism likely
would inspire fear in a reasonable listener.
Additionally, threats too abstract to induce fear in a reasonable listener
should not be excluded from First Amendment coverage. Measuring
abstractness of a threat is difficult task. But it should be clear that the broader
the threat is (for example, “Death to America!”), the more abstract—and
therefore the more diluted—the threat is. It is therefore unreasonable for any
individual to fear being subjected to physical violence. In that regard, the
more specific the threat (for example, “America should be destroyed through
a series of bomb attacks directed at government facilities!”), the more
reasonable the listener’s fear.
There is, admittedly, a seeming inconsistency between this argument’s
eagerness to avoid contextual analysis in determining whether a threat has
been made on the one hand and its willingness to incorporate such analysis
in determining the reasonableness of the victim’s fear on the other. The
inconsistency exists simply because, where feasible, the argument attempts
to favor a noncontextual approach to a contextual one. However, in the case
of the reasonableness of the victim’s fear, it is not feasible to divorce the
inquiry into the reasonableness of the fear in an individual case from an
inquiry into the specific circumstances surrounding the threat.
D. Threat to Kill or Seriously Injure
For terrorizing advocacy to be characterized as an unprotected true threat,
the speaker must advocate that a willing listener kill or seriously injure a

not fear the threat. In that case, the defendant would be responsible for producing specific
affirmative evidence to show that the listener did not fear the speech. Such evidence would
demonstrate that the threat from the speaker was not genuine and therefore that the speech did
not constitute terrorizing advocacy.
122. For a detailed discussion of the important role that context plays in cases involving
threats, see generally Karst, supra note 65.
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target. This is an intentionally high bar. Such a stringent requirement stems
from the need to accommodate competing considerations. The first
consideration is the need to protect the First Amendment right of individuals
to engage in persuasive speech, even if that speech advocates unlawful
behavior. Free speech is too central to the functioning of a liberal democracy
to deny protection to speech that fails to rise to the level of threatening
violence. The public sphere would atrophy if such widespread censorship
were constitutionally permitted.
The Court has recognized the need to allow individuals to express
themselves in ways that may be distasteful to others.123 Indeed, it is
presumably for just such reasons that unlawful advocacy is protected in the
first place. Speech of this type is still a form of persuasive expression; a
speaker is attempting to convince a willing listener to adopt a certain belief
or take a certain action. The importance of preserving robust protection for
individual free speech rights leads us to conclude that only a coercive speechact that induces substantial fear of physical violence in the intended victim
justifies exclusion of third-party threats from First Amendment protection.
Within the boundaries described, terrorizing advocacy loses its First
Amendment protection because of the coercive harm the threat element
causes to an unwilling listener. The harm to the individual upon hearing the
speech must be sufficiently substantial to justify restricting the free speech
rights of a speaker engaging in persuasive expression. Threats to cause
serious bodily harm induce existential fear in the targeted individual.124
Threats of violence are appropriately deemed categorically different from a
threat, for example, to defame someone. Threats to kill or seriously injure a
target are of such a seriously coercive nature that including them under the
purview of First Amendment protection cannot be justified, even when
coupled with otherwise protected expressive advocacy.
E. Specific Person or Group
The final requirement imposed by our model is that the third-party threat
must be directed toward a specific person or group. The more general the
threat, the less likely it is to reasonably induce fear in any single target.
Advocacy that threatens “infidels,” “America,” or “the West” is less likely to
reasonably induce fear in any single target than advocacy of violence against
a particular person, race, religion, ethnic group, or community. Requiring
the threat to be confined to a specific person or group assures that the
advocacy actually terrorizes. If a threat is general, it is less plausible that
someone will actually be intimidated.
By way of illustration, the threatening messaging in American Coalition of
Life Activists targeted both specific individuals (the named doctors) and a
specific group (doctors who perform abortions). This group of doctors—and,
in particular, the named doctors—would no doubt reasonably feel intimidated
123. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24–25 (1971).
124. For additional discussion regarding the harms caused by a threat to kill or seriously
injure someone, see Karst, supra note 65, at 1340–45.
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by the activists’ messaging. Similarly, the named judges in Turner make up
a group of specific individuals to whom death threats were addressed.
Establishing a bright-line rule for the requisite specificity is difficult. If
the terrorizing advocacy in the previously mentioned cases had been directed
toward broader audiences, such as “all doctors” or “all judges,” then it might
be less reasonable for those within the targeted group to feel threatened. Yet
under certain circumstances, it is at least arguable that threats against a broad
audience may still reasonably induce fear in targets. Thus, one possible way
to accommodate competing interests is for courts, based on past experience,
to inquire into the likelihood of the speech persuading individuals to commit
violence against the specified groups. In other words, courts should
determine whether a speaker’s generally framed threats have previously
persuaded willing listeners to attack members of those general groups. The
more evidence of past criminal conduct as the result of prior terrorizing
advocacy, the broader the group that can reasonably fear violence as the result
of similar future advocacy.
CONCLUSION
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first detailed account of the
phenomenon of the hybrid category of terrorizing advocacy and the first
attempt to shape First Amendment doctrine accordingly. The intended
contribution of this Article is twofold. Initially, it urges recognition of the
fallacy of mutual exclusivity between unprotected true threats and protected
unlawful advocacy. Secondly, it proposes a doctrinal model to determine
under what circumstances the expressive element in these hybrid situations
is to receive First Amendment protection.
Others will likely criticize this approach either for being underprotective
or for being overprotective of free speech. On the one hand, one could
plausibly suggest that, by turning the focus away from advocacy toward the
threat element, the doctrine risks undermining the free flow of public
discourse. On the other hand, the doctrine could just as easily be criticized
for its willingness to protect what arguably amounts to indirect coercive
threats. In certain senses, both positions present valid criticisms. But as is
often the case when one seeks to resolve sharply competing yet important
interests, the likelihood of such contrasting critiques perhaps suggests the
worthiness of this effort at developing an alternative compromise position.
We of course invite criticisms of the proposed model. This Article
identifies a strand of traditionally unlawful advocacy that shares the
pathologies of a true threat. This sort of unlawful advocacy is simultaneously
expressive and coercive. The present proposal to recognize the existence of
a hybrid category and to restructure First Amendment doctrine accordingly
is designed to impose only a limited burden on expressive speech that fosters
First Amendment values while simultaneously excluding most coercive
speech-acts that undermine the values underlying the First Amendment.

